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The Allocation of Effort under
Uncertainty: The Case of
Risk-averse Behavior

M. K. Block
Naval Postgraduate School

J. M. Heineke
University of Santa Clara

This paper analyzes the labor supply decision of a single economic agent
within the expected utility framework. Two formulations of the problem
are considered: pure income uncertainty and wage rate uncertainty. In
each case, the effects on the labor supply decision of changes in both
expected returns and the dispersion of returns (about a constant mean)
are investigated. Arguments concerning the "disincentive effects" of
uncertainty are shown not to be unambiguously supported by theory.

The pioneering work of Arrow ( 1965) in the theory of portfolio choice
and the recent contributions of Leland ( 1968, 1971), Mossin ( 1968a,
1968b), Sandmo (1969, 1970, 1971), Stiglitz (1969), and others clearly
testify to the power of the expected-utility hypothesis in analyzing various
problems of choice under uncertainty. But to our knowledge, a general
analysis of the effects of uncertainty on the labor supply decision has yet
to be done. 1 In this paper we examine the labor supply decisions of a single
economic agent in the expected utility framework.
We consider two models and in each analyze the response of the labor
supply decision to shifts in the subjective probability distribution of wages
and/or income. In model I the individual's income contains a stochastic
Received for publication November 19, 1971. Final version received March 14,
1972.
We are indebted to Hayne Leland, Gerald O'Mara, and Agnar Sandmo for their
suggestions and criticisms.
1 While some aspects of labor market uncertainty have been investigated in the job
search literature (e.g., Mortensen 1970) and in Block and Reineke (1972a, 1972b),
the traditional labor supply problem under uncertainty has not been analyzed.
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component although the wage rate is deterministic; in model II the wage
rate itself is stochastic. Attention is focused on the effects on labor supplied
of changes in expected returns and the dispersion of returns about a
constant mean. All results are distribution free.
The following definitions will be used: L =the labor allocation, L;?: 0;
w = the wage rate, w > 0, where w is a parameter in model I and a random variable in model II; Y = total income in the period of analysis:
Y0 =autonomous income, that is, income independent of labor force participation; and U (L, Y) = the individual's von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function.
In the work that follows, we assume that (i) income is a commodity
( Uy > 0) and labor is a discommodity ( UL < 0), and (ii) the individual
is risk averse ( U yy < 0) .2 As is well known, a general analysis of the
allocation decision under uncertainty requires additional information about
the agent's preferences. Elements of this situation are similar to those confronting the investigator in most household decision problems. In the labor
supply problem under conditions of certainty, assumptions (i) and (ii) are
sufficient to sign only direct-substitution terms generated by changes in
the wage rate; income effects remain unrestricted in the absence of further
assumptions. 3 Precisely the same statement applies to the stochastic analogue of this problem, that is, the substitution and income terms generated
by a change in the expected wage rate. In both the deterministic and
stochastic case, signing income effects requires additional explicit second
partial derivative information.
In stochastic models, considerable attention is directed toward determining the effects of changes in the "amount of uncertainty" in the system.
Such changes generate Slutsky-like expressions. Just as signing income
terms (produced by changes in the wage rate or expected wage rate)
requires more detailed information about preference orderings than does
signing substitution effects, so does signing "income uncertainty effects"
(produced by changes in the "amount of uncertainty") require more information than does signing the "uncertainty substitution effect." The sign
of the latter is determined merely by the agent's simple behavior toward
risk; that is, whether he has a preference for risk is risk neutral or risk
averse, while the former require some knowledge of third derivatives.
An appealing method of providing this information is to postulate plausible hypotheses regarding the agent's behavior toward risk as various arguments of the utility function change. For example, if utility is a function
of income, a risk-averse individual may become less risk averse as his
2 As usual, subscripts denote partial derivatives; e.g., Uy =aU jaY, UL = aUjaL,
and ULy=azu;aLaY.
3 Obviously, signing direct substitution terms requires only assumption (i). Assumption (ii) is neither necessary for signing substitution terms nor sufficient for signing
income terms.
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income increases. This hypothesis, Arrow-Pratt decreasing absolute risk
aversion, has been widely utilized and has yielded interesting results. However, as the recent work of Sandmo (1970, 1971) and Leland (1971) indicates, this hypothesis alone does not provide sufficient information in the
multicommodity case.
Therefore, we begin by specifying a coefficient of absolute risk aversion
in the multicommodity case, R(Y, L) = -Uyy/Ur, and assume this term
is invariant to the agent's labor allocation and decreasing in income (the
Arrow-Pratt hypothesis). Decreasing absolute risk aversion with respect to
income implies that the individual becomes increasingly willing to accept a
wager of a given size as his income increases, in the sense that odds demanded diminish. Arrow ( 1965) argues that both intuition and fact support this hypothesis. Intuitively, constant absolute risk aversion with
respect to labor implies that the odds demanded by the individual for
taking a risky action are not affected by how much he "works." Formally,
(iii) aR;av < o and (iv) aR;aL = o.
Assumptions (i)-(iv) and the traditional assumption (v) that in a
certain world labor is an inferior commodity,
(v)
are sufficient for a distribution-free analysis of the labor allocation problem
presented in models I and II. 4

Model I
In this model we take the rate of return in the labor market to be certain
but assume that income generated in the period contains a random component which is distributed independently of the individual's labor supply
decision. If A is an asset stock and x ;? -1 is the random rate of return
on the asset stock, then the case of an individual who "works" and has an
uncertain property income of Ax per period closely approximates this situation. Under these conditions, the individual's income opportunities are

Y=wL+e,

(1)

where e =Ax (=VO) and w is the known rate of return to labor.

The Labor Supply Decision: Income Uncertainty
The individual's labor supply decision is given by

maxf_"'A U(L,wL+e)j(e)de, 5

(2)

L

4 For convenience, we denote "certainty" as the case where all realizations of the
random variable Y are equal to EY.
5 This problem is formally equivalent to that explored by Sandmo (1970) in the
section of his paper entitled "Income Risk."
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subject to the condition 0 ~ L ~ l (Lis total time available) and solving
for L.6 In (2), f(e) is the individual's subjective probability density and
reflects the individual's beliefs as to the intervals in which e, property
income, is likely to lie. The necessary condition for a relative maximum is
(3)
with the strict inequality holding in the case where the labor supply decision is L = 0.
Only in very special cases will ( 3) reduce to the certainty decision rule.
Obviously, if the individual's utility function is linear in income, expression
(3) reduces to the traditional MRSn ~ w. One would expect that if an
individual is risk neutral in income ( Uvv = 0), income uncertainty alone
would not affect his decisions. 7 Moreover, since the stochastic component
of income is independent of L, ( 3) will also reduce to the certainty rule if
the individual's utility function is quadratic. The labor decision rule above
would then be an example of Theil's ( 1964) "certainty equivalence."
The restrictive nature of both of these utility functions is well known.
Risk neutrality clearly contradicts observed behavior, and as Arrow (1965)
has emphasized, the assumption of a quadratic utility function, while accounting for risk aversion, implies a serious contradiction of observed
portfolio behavior. Therefore, if the present analysis is to account for the
income implications of modern portfolio theory, ( 3) will not be immediately reducible to the certainty decision rule and the effects of uncertainty
on the optimum allocation of labor will require explicit consideration.
The Comparative Statics of Income Uncertainty 8
The second-order condition for a relative maximum is
(4)
The effect on labor supplied of a change in the expected value of e when
all other moments about the mean are fixed may be investigated by replacfh, where 81 is a shift parameter, differentiating
ing e in ( 3) with e
with respect to 81 and evaluating the result at 8t = 0. Thence,

+

(5)
Since all central moments of the distribution of e remain constant, a change
in 81 is the stochastic counterpart of a neoclassical lump-sum income transfer; and ( 5) is clearly negative by assumption ( v). That is,
For simplicity we assume L < I, i.e., the "upper bound" constraint is nonactive.
Note that behavior toward risk, while traditionally defined in terms of income,
might also be defined in terms of the discommodity labor. Surely the individual can
gamble with his labor input as well as income.
8 In this section and in the comparative-static analysis that follows, we consider only
internal solutions to the maximization problem.
6
7
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( 5')
Obviously, the inferiority of labor implies that increases in the expected
return from "property" lead to decreases in labor supplied (or increases
in leisure consumed).
While mean-value shifts have received considerable attention in traditional analysis, the effect on the labor allocation of increased "uncertainty"
in nonlabor income have not been adequately explored. The connection
between "stability" and work incentives is often implied, but a formal
framework appears to be lacking. As an initial step in this direction, we
consider the effect of a change in the "amount of uncertainty" in nonlabor
returns on the labor supply decision.
Formally, changes in the "amount of uncertainty" may be interpreted
as shifts in higher central moments of the distribution of e. Since, for
arbitrary probability distributions, the variance of e may be an unsatisfactory measure of dispersion, we follow the suggestion of Arrow ( 1965),
since utilized by Sandmo (1969, 1970, 1971) and Leland (1971), and
analyze the effects of a pure increase in dispersion by means of a multiplicative parameter shift followed by additive shift that leaves the mean
unchanged. 9 To proceed, replace e in (3) with y 1e
2 , where y 1 and (}!'.
are shift parameters. Since we desire E( e) to remain unchanged, dE( y 1 e
{}z) = 0 and d(} 2 /dy 1 = -E(e) = -b, where E(e) = 1\. Differentiating
( 3) with respect to Yt and evaluating the result at Yt = 1 and e2 = 0,
we have

+ (}

+

(6)

Expression ( 6) is the "income uncertainty effect" on labor supply of a
pure dispersion change.
In the discussion following equation ( 3) above, it is noted that if the
individual's utility function is quadratic in income, the stochastic decision
rule reduces to its "certainty equivalent" and hence uncertainty has no
allocative effects. Equation ( 6) is a direct assessment of the allocative
effects of uncertainty and yields in the case of a quadratic utility function
the expected result that CJL/CJy 1 = 0.
For the more general case, assumptions (iii)-(v) imply that Un
wUyy is increasing in Y and thus cov(e, ULv
wUn) is positive.U
Hence,

+

+

9 For a discussion of this method of analyzing increases in uncertainty, see Leland
(1970) and Sandmo (1970, 1971). An excellent discussion of alternative interpretations
of increasing risk is given in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
lOWe have written aLjay 1 as a covariance rather than as -E(ULY+wUyy)
(e- b)/H, since it is possible to directly sign the covariance expression.
11 To obtain this result, totally differentiate R with respect to L, noting aR;aL =
a(-ULy/Uy)/aY for continuous functions. Since dR/dL is negative by (iii) and
(iv), (v) implies a(ULY+wUn.)jaY>O.
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( 6')
Inequality ( 6') is a particularly intriguing result and indicates that the
individual uses the labor market as a "hedge" against uncertainty. As the
dispersion of nonlabor income increases, the individual compensates by
increasing his expected income. While this appears to be a type of "self
insurance," it is not a simple analogue of direct insurance. The inequality
aLjay 1 > 0 is an implication of the inferiority of labor and of a particular
type of change in behavior toward risk as income and labor change, not an
implication of behavior toward risk itself. In other words, direct insurance
behavior is implied by risk aversion, but, as indicated above, risk aversion
alone does not imply aLjay 1 > 0.

Model II
As indicated at the outset, there has been a very limited concern with the
explicit analysis of labor allocation under uncertainty. Institutional restrictions on the supply decision may account for some of this neglect, but it is
an unconvincing argument in the light of the attention given to "incentive"
or supply effects of tax schemes, etc., in a world of certainty. 12 Perhaps it
has been the intuitive feeling that in a fully employed economy the returns
to labor are the most certain of factor returns. Nonetheless, as the results
above indicate, even if the return to labor were certain, as long as some
stochastic element is present in income, labor allocation decisions will
depend on risk-taking behavior. Beyond this, we know that some occupations do have uncertain wage payments and that, more significantly, the
degree of certainty involved in all wage payments is to some extent institutionally determined. Random income taxes, random inflation, or the absence of property-rights enforcement would drastically alter the dispersion
of returns to laborY A theory of labor allocation should be able to predict
the effects of changes in institutional arrangements affecting the certainty
of returns in the labor market.
As an extention of the formal analysis of uncertainty and labor "incentives," in this model we take the rate of return in the labor market to be a
random variable. Income in the period is given by
1 2 For example, see Cooper (1959) and Musgrave (1959); or for evidence of more
recent concern, see Cassidy (1970).
13 Traditional investigations (nonstochastic) of the effect of taxation on labor allocations, such as Cooper (1959) and Cassidy (1970), emphasize what are essentially meanvalue shifts in our model. As the discussion above indicates, there is an additional set
of incentive questions associated with dispersion shifts. Clearly, there is an effect on
labor allocation due to changes in the degree of certainty surrounding incidence. However, even if the tax is known with certainty, to the extent that the wage rate is
stochastic, tax policy will have dispersion effects. In fact, changes in tax rates under
these conditions will have both mean and dispersion effects. An intriguing area of
further research is the extension of Mossin's (1968) and Leland's (1971) taxation
analysis to the labor allocation problem.
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Y= yo +wL.

(7)

Formally, the individual's labor supply decision is determined by
maxl,"' U(L, yo+ wL)f(w)dw,
o

[L]

(8)

subject to 0:;:;:;; L:;:;:;; L. 14 The function f(w) is the individual's subjective
probability density on w. The first-order condition for a relative maximum
is
(9)
Again, if utility were linear in income, (9) would reduce to the certainty decision rule: MRSYL;;? E(w). However, unlike model I, in this
case quadratic utility will not yield "certainty equivalence" and has, as the
discussion below indicates, rather special implications for the effects of
wage uncertainty on labor allocation.
The Comparative Statics of Wage-Rate Uncertainty

Given an internal solution to ( 9),
G- EU£[,

+ 2E(wUn) + E(w Un) < 0
2

(IO)

is sufficient for a relative maximum. The effect on labor supplied of changes
in the expected wage rate may be ascertained in the same manner as above.
If we let w = w
f)s, then

+

aLja8 3

=

-EUyjG- LE(U~oy

+ wUn)/G.

(II)

The first term is the substitution effect of a change in the expected wage
rate and is obviously positive. The second term is the income effect of a
change in the expected wage rate and, like equation ( 5) above, is negative
by assumption (v). Consequently, if we accept the often employed assumption that the labor supply function bends back on itself, (II) would
generate the stochastic analogue of the neoclassical backward-bending labor
supply function. 1 5
One interesting question remains: Can anything be said about the individual's labor supply decision when the wage rate becomes more uncertain?
We proceed as before and investigate a change in wage-rate dispersion
about a constant mean. Substituting w = y 2 w
4 into (9), differentiating with respect to y 2 [with d(} 4 /dy 2
-E(w) in this case], and evaluating the derivative at y 2
1, and (} 4
0, we have

=

=
=

+ (}

<

As before, we assume for simplicity L
L.
For a recent study that uses this assumption, see Cassidy ( 1970). Formally,
whether the supply function is backward bending or not is a question of whether or
not there exists an L* <I such that (9) is maximum at L* (i.e., whether or not there
exists an L*
L such that substitution effects dominate for L L* and income effects
dominate for L > L*).
14

15

<

<
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aL;ay2 = -cov(Uy, w)/G- L cov (w, ULY

+ wUn)/G.

(12)

Since equation ( 12) is a Slutsky-like equation, we call the first term the
"uncertainty substitution effect" and the second the "income uncertainty
effect." This substitution effect measures the response of the individual's
labor supply decision due solely to changes in wage-rate uncertainty. As is
obvious from ( 12), and as would be expected, risk-averse behavior implies
that this term is negative. The income uncertainty effect in equation ( 12)
measures the response of the labor supply decision attributable solely to the
increased income uncertainty implied by the increase in wage uncertainty.
This term is analogous to equation ( 6) and is positive. 16
As indicated above, the income uncertainty result depends on the inferiority of labor and a particular set of assumptions concerning behavior
toward risk as Y and L change. For example, if the utility function is
quadratic, the income uncertainty effect will be zero. However, in the more
general and empirically relevant case, increases in the dispersion of the
wage rate induce the individual to supply more effort in an attempt to
compensate for the additional income uncertainty. 17
Combining income and substitution effects, we see that changes in wagerate dispersion lack unambiguous incentive effects. Only through empirically dubious restrictions on the utility function does the ambiguity in (12)
disappear.
As ( 11) and ( 12) indicate, an increase in wage-rate dispersion has precisely the same qualitative effect on the labor supply decision as a decrease in the expected wage rate. The intuitive explanation is that riskaverse individuals view increased wage uncertainty and decreases in mean
wages as "costs" in the sense that each of these parameter shifts has the
effect of lowering the chances that a realized wage rate will fall within
some specified "acceptable" range. Hence, each shift leads to decreases in
labor supplied in substitution terms and increases in labor supplied via
income effects.

Summary and Some Implications

An intriguing implication of our analysis is that, contrary to often professed beliefs, increased income uncertainty, under very reasonable assumptions, unequivocally brings about increases in labor force participation.
However, when the increase in income uncertainty is generated by a change
in the dispersion of a wage rate, more than income uncertainty must be
The proof is entirely similar to that of (6) above.
Unlike its implication in the previous model, a quadratic utility function now has
allocative significance because of the nonzero substitution term; and an increase in
wage dispersion \\ill always decrease the supply of effort.
16

17
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considered. Since an individual can reduce uncertainty by substituting
away from the activity, there is a substitution effect that moves in the
opposite direction. It is the substitution effect that provides the theoretical
underpinnings for statements about the "disincentive" effects of uncertainty.
It is now clear that arguments concerning the "disincentive" effects of
uncertainty are not unambiguously supported by theory. In fact, increases
in the dispersion of factor returns may, paradoxically, have strong incentive
effects. As we have shown and as Sandmo ( 1970) had indicated in a
different context, to the extent that uncertainty is not directly tied to the
allocative decision risk-averse individuals will increase their productive
efforts as uncertainty increases. Even in those cases where increases in
dispersion are directly related to the allocative decision (wage-rate uncertainty), the "disincentive" effects of increased uncertainty are not
derivable from theoretical considerations alone. 18 While the "uncertainty
substitution effects" suggest a substitution away from the affected activity,
one must have knowledge of relative magnitudes, since the "income uncertainty effect" moves in the opposite direction and may either dominate
or be dominated by the substitution effect. Therefore, under very plausible
behavioral assumptions, the "conventional wisdom" of the importance of
"stability" (the minimization of uncertainty) in factor returns is either a
testable hypothesis about relative magnitudes or a normative statement.
In a world of risk-averse individuals, it is true that costless decreases in
the dispersion of returns is a Pareto-relevant action. But a fascinating implication, in terms of positive analysis, of the particular set of behavioral
assumptions employed in this paper is that public policy directed at reducing uncertainty may have "disincentive" effects. And an appropriately
designed increase in income uncertainty may be used as a policy instrument for increasing the supply of labor, but it could not of course be
defended with Pareto considerations. Risk-averse individuals lose as uncertainty increases, and their factor reallocation is only a reaction to a less
hospitable world.
Our analysis of the labor decision and Sandmo's ( 1970) analysis of the
savings decision both treat one aspect of the household decision in isolation. An interesting avenue of further research is the integration of both
decisions into a single model of household decision making in which the
supply of labor and savings are jointly determined and both factor returns
are stochastic. 19
18 That is, "distinctive" effects of increased uncertainty do not follow from risk
aversion.
19 For an extension of Sandmo (1970) to the joint labor-savings decision, see Block
and Reineke ( 1972a). This paper utilizes relatively strong assumptions, some of which
are relaxed in Block and Reineke (1972b).
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